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Transitional Justice in Post-war Afghanistan
by Ossai Miazad*
The September 11th attacks on the United States (U.S.)and the ensuing war against terrorism have galvanizedworld attention onto the political situation in
Afghanistan. This attention is likely to lead Afghanistan into
a phase of reconstruction after two decades of war and con-
flict. The country’s political leaders face many challenges as
they seek to rebuild the nation and restore the rule of law.
Similar to the experience of other transitional governments,
Afghanistan’s newly established leaders will be required to
address the severe and systematic violations of humanitarian
and human rights law perpetrated by the previous regimes
and the country’s warring factions. During the last decade of
conflict in Afghanistan in particular, these violations have
taken on the added dimensions of ethnic- and gender-based
persecution. If Afghanistan is to move toward a durable
peace, it must break the cycle of impunity by instituting a legal
approach to account for past abuses of humanitarian and
human rights law.
On December 5, 2001, the United Nations (UN) bro-
kered talks in Bonn, Germany, culminating in an agreement
for Afghanistan’s future political framework. This remarkable
achievement marked a new beginning for the war-torn nation.
By establishing a six-month interim administration, the agree-
ment signaled the first step toward the country’s recon-
struction. After six months, power will shift to a two-year
transitional administration; at the end of this term, power will
be transferred to a government established through national
elections. The agreement addresses important human rights
concerns, particularly with regard to the representation of
women and ethnic minorities in the new administration.
Although earlier drafts of the agreement prohibited an
interim authority from granting amnesty to those suspected
of crimes against humanity, the provision was later deleted
from the final agreement at the insistence of members of the
United Front delegation. The final agreement remains silent
on the transitional authorities’ obligation and commitment
to bringing war criminals to justice. 
The formidable task of rebuilding Afghanistan and rein-
tegrating it into the international community will require mea-
sures to ensure accountability for past war crimes. Afghanistan
is obligated by the UN Conventions to which it is a party, and
by international customary law, to hold accountable perpe-
trators of humanitarian and human rights law violations.
Further, by establishing a well-crafted and effective legal
response to such violations, a new Afghan government can
meet the goals of serving justice, building confidence in the
new administration, and prohibiting war criminals from
entering future governments.
Background
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 24,
1979, motivated both by political expansionist goals and the
fear that instability within its small Central Asian neighbor
might spill into its own borders. Its immediate task was to
crush the uprisings stirred by the policies and repressive tac-
tics of the Khalq faction of the People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan, an Afghan communist party that had seized
control of the country through a coup d’etat on April 27,
1978.
An estimated 1.24 million Afghans died during the decade-
long Soviet occupation, and the flow of refugees, primarily
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to bordering Pakistan and Iran, reached five million. Armed
groups at the center of the resistance against the Soviet
occupation collectively became known as the mujahiddin.
Although engaged in a common resistance movement, the
mujahiddin were composed of ethnic, tribal, and political
factions as diverse as the population of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan became a Cold War battleground. The United
States and Saudi Arabia provided most of the massive support
for the resistance, nearly all of which was funneled through Pak-
istan. The policy implemented on the ground was to provide
the greatest support to the most radical mujahiddin groups.
Thousands of fighters from the Middle East and North Africa
joined the resistance forces. Among them was Osama bin
Laden, who came to Pakistan in the early 1980s and built
training facilities for these foreign recruits inside Afghanistan.
The final withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in
February of 1989 did not lead to an end to armed conflict in
the country. Despite the troop withdrawals, a Soviet-supported
government remained in control. By 1992 the mujahiddin had
toppled the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan. In the
aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, the U.S. and its western
allies abandoned war-torn Afghanistan. The United Nations’
efforts toward brokering a settlement for a transitional gov-
ernment suffered from a lack of commitment by Afghanistan’s
neighbors and the international community. No longer
engaged against a common enemy, a power struggle among
the various mujahiddin factions soon erupted. It was within
this political vacuum that armed factions, many led by former
mujahiddin commanders, established themselves as the local
authority. 
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The framework for an interim government forged by
Pakistani-based mujahiddin in the Peshawar Agreement of
April 24, 1992, crumbled only months after its implementa-
tion. The failed power sharing agreement of the Afghan
Interim Government (AIG) left Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader
of the mujahiddin faction of Jamiat-e Islami (Society of Islam),
and his defense minister Ahmad Shah Massoud, seated in the
capital city of Kabul, although their control over the capital
was by no means complete. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of
Hezb-e Islami (Islamic Party), a rival mujahiddin faction and
prime minister of the AIG, continued to bombard Kabul,
and by 1994 a full-scale civil war had erupted among the var-
ious rival factions. The Rabbani government remained in
Kabul until September 1996 when its members were forced
to retreat north by the Taliban, an armed militia comprised
mainly of non-Afghan combatants and Afghan refugees, who
had studied in religious schools in Pakistan.
With extensive foreign support, particularly from Pakistan,
the Taliban declared itself the government of Afghanistan in
1996. Initial signs from
Washington indicated




Laden and its violations
of basic human rights
principles, particularly
regarding women’s
rights, led to its isola-
tion by the international
community. Only Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Pakistan
granted the Taliban offi-
cial recognition. The
rise of the Taliban spurred the formation of the anti-Taliban
coalition known as the United Front (including parties that for-
merly made up the Northern Alliance), whose main foreign sup-
porters included India, Iran, and Russia. The United Front,
which controlled pockets of territory in northern and central
Afghanistan, supported the government headed by Rabbani.
Because the Taliban had not consolidated control over the
entire country, military offensives and fighting between the Tal-
iban and United Front continued throughout the Taliban’s
reign in Kabul.
Violations of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law
Severe violations of international humanitarian and
human rights law have occurred throughout the conflicts in
Afghanistan. The violations of humanitarian law have
included direct attacks on civilian populations, indiscriminate
aerial bombardment, summary executions, and rape. No
single faction holds a monopoly on committing these viola-
tions; rather, a cycle of impunity has instigated reprisal
killings and the repetition of atrocities. In many cases,
support from neighboring countries has fueled the violence
by pitting one warring faction against the other. Addition-
ally, each faction is responsible for violations of human
rights law, including arbitrary detention, forced labor, forced
deportations, and ethnic based violence. Moreover, women
and girls living under the Taliban regime have perhaps
faced some of the most severe and systematic human rights
violations.
Humanitarian Law
The principles set out by the 1949 Geneva Conventions
(Conventions) guide international humanitarian law. As a sig-
natory to the Conventions, Afghanistan is a High Contract-
ing Party and is bound by Common Article 3. Aimed at
ensuring the humane treatment of anyone not participating
in hostilities, Common Article 3 applies as soon as a situation
of internal armed conflict exists within the territory of a
party to the Conventions. The legal obligations imposed on
each party to the conflict, with respect to the treatment of
persons taking no active part in hostilities, prohibit the fol-
lowing acts: (1) violence to life and person, in particular mur-
der of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (2)
taking of hostages; (3) outrages upon personal dignity, in par-
ticular humiliating and degrading treatment; and (4) pass-
ing sentences and carrying out executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court that
affords the judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples. Further, the customary law of armed con-
flict recognizes the principle of civilian immunity and the
obligation of warring parties to distinguish between com-
batants and civilians. UN
General Assembly Reso-
lution 2444, Respect for
Human Rights in Armed
Conflicts, adopted on
December 19, 1968, pro-
hibits attacks on civilian
populations, and notes
that a distinction must be
made at all times between
persons taking part in hos-
tilities and members of
the civilian population in
order to ensure that the
latter be spared as much
as possible.
Indiscriminate Bombings
The civilian population in Afghanistan has suffered
repeated violations of humanitarian law through indis-
criminate bombings and targeted persecution based on eth-
nicity or political affiliation. For example, during the Soviet-
backed Afghan government’s military operations, Scud
missiles and other methods of warfare that lack sufficient
accuracy and targeting capability were employed. Weapons
that cannot be directed at a specific military objective violate
the laws of war, because their use leaves the civilian popu-
lation vulnerable.
An estimated 25,000 people were killed in Kabul in 1994
alone when Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and General Abdul
Rashid Dostum, founder and principle leader of the Junbish-
i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan (National Islamic Movement of
Afghanistan) (Junbish) launched a full-scale civil war in an
effort to oust the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani.
Civilians comprised most of the casualties resulting from
rocket and artillery attacks. A 1999 UN report noted that in
recent years the Taliban has intensified aerial bombard-
ment, causing considerable civilian casualties, damage to
property, and displacement of the population.
Forced Displacement and Summary Execution
Political affiliation or perceived loyalties have rendered
individuals and entire communities victims of acts of vio-
lence and terror. Human Rights Watch has documented the
Post-war Afghanistan, continued from previous page
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Official signing of the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in
Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government
Institutions.
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targeting of ethnic Pashtuns and others suspected of sup-
porting the Taliban in areas controlled by the United Front.
Such targeting, which took place as recently as 2000, included
summary executions, burning of houses, and looting. In May
1997, Junbish forces, as members of the United Front under
the command of General Abdul Malik Pahlawan, summarily
executed an estimated 3,000 Taliban prisoners of war in
Mazar-i Sharif. Accounts of the brutal killings indicate that
some of the prisoners of war were taken to the desert and shot
while others were thrown down wells and blown up with
grenades. A report prepared by Kamal Hossain, UN Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, describes
reported summary executions of suspected supporters of
the United Front by
Taliban forces entering
into villages in Bamyan,




ment of 65,000 to
150,000 civilians during
a Taliban offensive in
the Shamali Plains, an
area north of Kabul
controlled by opposi-
tion forces. The Special
Rapporteur’s report
cites first-hand accounts









Human rights organizations and the UN have docu-
mented several Taliban-led massacres of the Hazara ethnic
minority. Two of the most recent massacres occurred in
May 2000 and January 2001. The latest reported massacre
occurred at Yakaolang in the central highlands of
Afghanistan. One UN investigator described the sight of
bodies in a mass grave, hands tied behind their backs: “[i]n
no way was Yakaolang an isolated, or locally organized event,”
but rather “a centrally organized operation.” UN investiga-
tors estimate there have been fifteen separate massacres of
civilians over the last four years, and explain that each mas-
sacre has been highly systematic and can be traced to the Tal-
iban’s Ministry of Defense or to Mullah Omar, the Taliban
self-proclaimed Amir al-Momeneen (Ruler of the Faithful).
The UN report also notes the participation of non-Afghan
combatants, including Pakistanis and members of Osama bin
Laden’s al-Qaeda organization.
The Intersection of Gender and Ethnicity: Rape as a 
Weapon of War
Women have been targeted on the basis of both gender
and ethnicity, and have faced sexual assault, abduction, and
forced marriage throughout the armed conflict. A 2001
Human Rights Watch report named opposition comman-
ders with records of serious violations of humanitarian law.
The report documented the February 1993 killing, rape,
and disappearances of ethnic Hazaras in West Kabul per-
petuated by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittihad-i Islami (Islamic
Union). Further, the 1995 U.S. State Department report on
human rights practices noted that after capturing Kabul’s
predominantly ethnic-Hazara neighborhood of Karte Seh,
Northern Alliance troops systematically looted whole streets
and raped the women residents. 
Human Rights Law
Similar to the humanitarian law violations, there have been
widespread abuses of human rights law. Throughout the
conflict, women have suffered some of the most egregious
human rights violations. The most systematic and horrific vio-




Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the Inter-
national Covenant on
Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in 1983,
and the Covenant on
the Rights of the Child
in 1994. In 1980,
Afghanistan signed, but





The principles set forth
in the treaties, as well
as in the UN Declara-
tion of Human Rights,
grant women and girls
the fundamental rights
to education, work,
health care, freedom of
movement, and equality under the law. The ICCPR specifi-
cally protects women from gender-based violence, and tor-
ture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment.
Through official edicts, the Taliban prohibited girls from
going to school, refused women the right to work outside the
home, with the exception of some health care workers, and
severely restricted women’s and girls’ access to adequate
health care. In addition to denying these basic human rights,
the Taliban severely restricted women’s freedom of move-
ment. By official decree women were prohibited from leav-
ing their homes unless they wore a burqa (a head-to-toe gar-
ment with a small mesh opening at the eyes) and were
accompanied by a close male relative. Before the Taliban
assumed control, seventy percent of all teachers, fifty percent
of civil servants, and forty percent of medical doctors in the
country were women. The policies of the Taliban have taken
a heavy toll on the people of Afghanistan, particularly women
and girls.
According to a 1999 report issued by Radhika
Coomaraswamy, UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, the Taliban enforced their discriminatory edicts by
punishment without any due process rights. Punishment for
4
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transgressions against the Taliban’s regulations included
public flogging, stoning, and public execution. Murder,
working with the opposition, sodomy, and adultery were con-
sidered crimes that carried the death penalty. Amnesty Inter-
national reported that during 2000 at least fifteen people faced
public executions, including the stoning to death of a woman.
The Taliban’s policy toward women and girls has had a life-
threatening effect on an already suffering population. Each
day an estimated forty-five Afghan women die from pregnancy-
related causes, and the rate of illiteracy among girls has
reached ninety percent. In 1998, Physicians for Human
Rights reported that ninety-four percent of the Afghan women
interviewed suffered from severe depression. Women and girls
will likely continue to feel the impact of the discriminatory
policies long after the Taliban’s departure.
International Obligations and Mechanisms for 
Accountability 
The kind of violence and persecution that occurred in
Afghanistan makes granting blanket immunity to perpetra-
tors of abuses inconsistent with
international law standards. A
new government in Afghanistan
will have the obligation to at
least punish the most egregious
human rights violations. This
obligation is most explicitly set
forth by the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Geno-
cide Convention) and the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment (CAT). These conventions require states not only to
protect the rights prescribed, but also to prosecute acts of
genocide and torture perpetrated in their territories.
Afghanistan ratified the Genocide Convention in 1956 and
the CAT in 1987. Article 5 of the Genocide Convention
requires contracting parties “to provide effective penalties for
persons guilty of genocide.” Further, Article 6 requires that
persons charged with genocide “shall be tried by a compe-
tent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was
committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may
have jurisdiction.” Similarly, the CAT requires states either
to investigate and prosecute those who commit acts of
torture, or to extradite suspects to other jurisdictions. Cus-
tomary law imposes a similar obligation: “[a] state violates cus-
tomary law if it practices or encourages genocide, fails to
make genocide a crime or to punish persons guilty of it, or
otherwise condones genocide.” 
A variety of mechanisms for accountability have been
implemented in countries emerging from conflict.
Approaches include domestic prosecution by establishing a
special prosecutors office and using the local courts; non-
criminal sanctioning to offset the challenges related to crim-
inally prosecuting large numbers of individuals involved in
violations; and truth and reconciliation commissions to col-
lect testimony and document the history of the abuses. 
Domestic Prosecution
Major challenges to a new government in Afghanistan will
include establishing legitimacy and credibility as well as the rule
of law. The commitment to hold parties accountable for
human rights violations could represent an important step in
that direction. Although the legal system in Afghanistan
requires rebuilding, a domestic response to past war crimes
will likely demonstrate the greatest legitimacy and garner
support among the Afghan people. There is a commonly
held perception among Afghans that they have been the vic-
tims of foreign meddling. Many of the war criminals that
should be brought to justice have received support from
neighboring countries. A domestic tribunal can thus help to
establish the sentiment that the country is reclaiming control
rather than perpetuating a sense of helplessness. 
Several challenges exist to the domestic prosecution of war
criminals in Afghanistan. Factional rifts and suspicion have
intensified as a result of the war. Consequently, maintaining
a sense of order and fairness may be difficult. These issues
have been mitigated in other countries facing similar situa-
tions by ensuring transparency throughout the prosecution
process as well as the diversity of investigators, prosecutors,
and judges. The prosecution process must be committed to
investigating and prosecuting war crimes committed by indi-
viduals on all sides. 
The violations that have occurred in Afghanistan have
been so extensive and widespread that prosecution of every
perpetrator may be impossible and destabilizing. Interna-
tional practice suggests that in such
a situation, representative prosecu-
tion of those most culpable may sat-
isfy international obligations. For
example, the tribunals established
in Rwanda delineated four levels of
culpability: (1) the planners and lead-
ers of the genocide, those in posi-
tions of authority who fostered these
crimes, and particularly notorious
killers and sexual torturers; (2) oth-
ers who killed; (3) those who committed crimes other than
rape or murder against persons; and (4) those who com-
mitted offenses against property. All suspects who fell into
the first category should find themselves subject to full pros-
ecution and punishment. If those in the second and third cat-
egories, who are likely to make up the vast majority, fully con-
fess to their crimes and provide information on accomplices
or co-conspirators, they will in turn receive an expedited
process and reduced penalty. Finally, fourth category suspects
will not face criminal prosecution.
Non-criminal Sanctions
Non-criminal sanctions can also serve an important and
necessary function. Such sanctions may prevent guilty par-
ties from assuming public office. It is difficult to imagine how
a new Afghan government can win the confidence of the mil-
lions of refugees and internally displaced people who will
return to Afghanistan to find the individuals responsible
for the atrocities committed against them in renewed posi-
tions of authority. An example of the use of non-criminal
sanctions can be found in the Dayton Peace Accords, which
brought an end to the fighting in Bosnia by requiring “the
prosecution, dismissal or transfer, as appropriate, of persons
in military, paramilitary, and police forces and other public
servants, responsible for serious violations of the basic rights
of persons belonging to ethnic or minority groups.”
Truth Commissions
Truth commissions, often mandated to create an official
history of past human rights abuses, can also be charged with
proposing specific steps to deal with past abuses and to
prevent their repetition. Truth commissions are often based
Post-war Afghanistan, continued from previous page
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that occurred in Afghanistan makes 
granting blanket immunity to perpetrators
of abuses inconsistent with international
law standards.
continued on page 24
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on mandates to study the broader context in which the
abuses occur and the structural elements of the govern-
ment, security forces, and society that make patterns of vio-
lations possible. Analysis and reporting that could guide
government policy would be particularly relevant regarding
the violations against women’s rights. 
A truth and reconciliation commission can serve an
important and necessary function in the nation building
process, particularly when there has been a stream of human
rights violations inflicted upon the population, as in
Afghanistan. This function is not a substitute for criminal
prosecution. In fact, a commission of inquiry into human
rights has worked well when implemented in tandem with
criminal proceedings by collecting testimony and docu-
menting abuses later used in criminal prosecution cases.
Jirga 
The traditional process by which Afghans have solved
issues ranging from local disputes to those of national impor-
tance has been through the Jirga (Assembly). Representatives
of tribes and communities gather to decide questions that
affect their families, villages, tribes, region, and nation.
Groundwork for a Jirga to address war crimes can be mod-
eled after the arrangement made by the Bonn Agreement for
the convening of a Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly). An inde-
pendent commission of twenty-one constitutional and cus-
tomary law experts has been charged with convening an
assembly for the purpose of selecting a transitional govern-
ment. Similarly, a commission of international and cus-
tomary law experts can be established to lay the framework
for accountability. Because representatives to the Jirga have
traditionally been male tribal elders, special attention will
have to be paid to the representation of women. One option
would be to establish a sub-commission to address the vio-
lence and abuses faced by women and girls.
Many advantages will result from domestic prosecution of
war crimes in an indigenous Afghan mechanism familiar to
the population. There will also be great need, however, for
outside support to ensure compliance with international
law standards. Because Afghanistan’s infrastructure has been
destroyed and its human and material resources depleted,
serious challenges exist for an exclusively domestic response.
Significantly, Annex II, point 6 of the Bonn Agreement
retains the right of the UN to investigate human rights vio-
lations and recommend corrective measures. The interna-
tional community, particularly those non-governmental orga-
nizations that have been monitoring and documenting the
situation in Afghanistan, can play an essential role as advi-
sors, experts, and investigators. 
Conclusion
It is indisputable that Afghanistan must address severe vio-
lations of humanitarian and human rights law. Such a course
of action must be taken immediately, as the threat of war
criminals entering the transitional government and poten-
tially destabilizing Afghanistan once again looms.
Each of the mechanisms discussed has an important role
to play in the effort to hold violators of humanitarian and
human rights law accountable while rebuilding Afghanistan.
Shared domestic and international cooperation is neces-
sary to criminally prosecute those responsible for the most
egregious violations, such as massacres. Non-criminal sanc-
tions can be employed to ensure that those culpable—even
if not prosecuted criminally—do not assume positions of
authority. A truth commission has the advantage of begin-
ning promptly and moving the country toward reconciliation,
as well as compiling a historical record to prevent the past
from repeating itself. Ethnic minorities and women must
receive adequate representation and attention in these pro-
ceedings, as they have faced some of the most systematic and
widespread violence. Although challenges exist to attain-
ing accountability, Afghanistan’s compliance with interna-
tional and customary law standards and its realization of
sustainable peace and reconstruction requires the new gov-
ernment to meet the challenge.
* Ossai Miazad is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
24
Conclusion
Despite numerous setbacks and uneven results in the
attempts of African nations to establish human rights insti-
tutions, there have been some positive developments, par-
ticularly within the last decade. Clearly, the increasing inter-
national commitment to the establishment of national human
rights bodies has raised the profile of human rights issues
within Africa, and has tied international legitimacy to the con-
tinent’s efforts to improve human rights protection.
On the other hand, the international community’s involve-
ment in the establishment of these commissions has not
always been an effective way of promoting or protecting
human rights. The advice and funding given is often generic
and not tailored to a country’s particular needs. Further,
there tends to be little coordination between the various fund-
ing sources. As in Sierra Leone, this lack of coordination often
results in development and support for only one successful
project at a time, but no effective overall strategy. 
The international community’s indiscriminate support for
all human rights commissions, regardless of their effective-
ness, might suggest support for commissions that blatantly
fail to expose or protect against human rights abuses. As
Afronet Online, an African NGO based in Zambia, remarked,
“. . . [i]t would seem that pronouncements made loudly at
appropriate fora, coupled with structures put in place by
African governments, are part of the grand deception of their
people (and the international community) to give an impres-
sion of the improving human rights record in their respec-
tive countries.” Clearly, the international community does not
want to be seen as supporting attempts to overlook or con-
ceal human rights abuses.
International donors and institutions must consider what
is needed to help countries develop institutions for the pro-
motion and protection of human rights. There is a need for
greater analysis of how international funding is being distrib-
uted, as well as the need for a more result-oriented process for
supporting effective national human rights bodies. 
* Mary Ellen Tsekos is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
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